


Social behavior, part 2



The termite queen in her egg chamber

Types of social interactions



**Change in
recipient fitness**

**Change
in actor
fitness**

	+	-
+	mutualism	selfishness
-	altruism	spite

Mutualism

- Inter- or intra-specific interaction in which both interactors benefit immediately
 - Examples
 - Seed dispersal/Pollination
 - Foraging/Grooming
 - Protection



Types of social interactions



**Change in
recipient fitness**

**Change
in actor
fitness**


	+	-
+	mutualism	selfishness
-	altruism	spite

Explanation is either: 1) reciprocal altruism or 2) kin selection




Reciprocal altruism

- Cotton-top tamarins
 - Positioning food to help a companion grab it
 - Occurred much more often when focal tamarin was matched with a tamarin (unrelated) who helped in the past



Game theory

- General question: what is optimal behavior in a situation where there isn't a single "best" thing to do
 - Depends on what others do (or are *likely* to do)
- John Nash
 - Nobel prize (Economics) for contributions to game theory
 - "Nash equilibrium"
 - Stable equilibrium allowing two strategies in a game to coexist
- Game theory uses models to predict phenomena, and can determine which variables underly the decision rules
 - Makes predictions about which social behaviors will be stable over evolutionary time (ESS = evolutionarily stable strategies)
 - » ESS = a set of behaviors that is resistant to "invasion" by any mutant alternatives *if everyone's already doing the current ESS*



Reciprocal altruism

- Using game theory to model cooperation

		Player B	
		Cooperate	Defect
Player A	Cooperate	Reward for mutual cooperation (1 year)	Maximum punishment (10 years)
	Defect	Maximum reward (freedom)	Punishment for mutual defection (5 years)

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Reciprocal altruism

- Using game theory to model cooperation
 - Simple prisoner's dilemma computes that reciprocal altruism shouldn't evolve
 - Always better to defect (i.e., cheaters are favored; reciprocity not an ESS)

Player A

		Player B	
		Cooperate	Defect
Player A	Cooperate	Reward for mutual cooperation (1 year)	Maximum punishment (10 years)
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Reciprocal altruism

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energy and risk of sharing
drops food value by 0.4

		Player B	
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Player A	Cooperate	Reward for mutual cooperation (+0.6 food)	Maximum punishment (-0.4 food)
	Defect	Maximum reward (+1.0 food)	Punishment for mutual defection (0 food)

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Reciprocal altruism

energy and risk of sharing
drops food value by 0.4

– How to model reciprocity

- “tit-for-tat” can be an ESS:
 - Rule: always start as cooperator, and then do what other did
 - » Rewards from back and forth cooperation ADD UP, exceeding short-term payoff from a single defection
 - » ESS when there are multiple interactions with same individuals AND individual recognition

		Player B	
		Cooperate	Defect
Player A	Cooperate	Reward for mutual cooperation (+0.6 food)	Maximum punishment (-0.4 food)
	Defect	Maximum reward (+1.0 food)	Punishment for mutual defection (0 food)

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Reciprocal altruism

- Allo-feeding in vampire bats: unrelated females share blood meals with unsuccessful foragers
 - Reciprocity can evolve because:
 - 1) Many chances for repeated interaction
 - 2) Individual recognition, so can punish cheaters (withhold blood)
 - 3) Cost to donor low (little blood given), but VERY beneficial to the starving receiver (can survive until can suck blood tomorrow)





<https://ncase.me/trust/>

Types of social interactions

Change in
recipient fitness


Change
in actor
fitness

	+	-
+	mutualism	selfishness
-	altruism	spite

Either reciprocal altruism or kin selection

Inclusive fitness

- Fitness refers to number of surviving offspring and other descendant relatives (grandchildren, etc.)
 - Each offspring contains only half of parent's genes
 - Siblings also share half their genes, *because they had the same parents*. These genes are identical by descent (IBD)




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
- What really matters is inclusive fitness
 - Direct fitness = via reproduction (own kids)
 - Indirect fitness = via non-descendant relatives
 - **Direct + Indirect = Inclusive Fitness**

- Doing something that causes others to produce non-descendant relatives is (genetically) just like reproducing: helping mom & dad to make an “extra” sibling is like having a kid of your own




Calculating relatedness

- It's not just about siblings and offspring...
 - All relatives that share common ancestor(s) have copies of genes that are Identical by Descent (IBD)
 - Can calculate relatedness (r) for any category of relative
 - Probability that a particular gene is IBD in both individuals or, proportion of IBD genes shared between 2 individuals



Calculating relatedness

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“I would give up my life for 2 brothers or ?? cousins”


Florida scrub jay example

- Only 1 nest (and 1 breeding pair) in group
 - Non-breeding helpers feed young, fight off predators, defend territory
 - Why do helpers stay and forego their own reproduction?
 - No place to go: all good habitat filled, so have to wait
 - Next best thing to own reproduction: help raise 'extra' kin



Effects of helpers on fitness

- Helpers really do help in raising more siblings
 - when removed helpers: do not produce as many young



Hamilton's Rule

- Hamilton's Rule (i.e., how kin selection works)
 - Genes influencing behavior increase if ...

$$rB - C > 0$$


$$\text{or: } rB > C$$

- B = benefit to the recipient
- C = cost to the altruist
- r = coefficient of relatedness




Kinship calculations

- (r) relatedness:
 - Probability that alleles in one individual are shared, due to common ancestry, in another individual
- According to Hamilton's Rule, would you lay down your life for one sister?
 - Remember it will be favored if $rB-C > 0$



Kinship calculations

- (r) relatedness:
 - Probability that alleles in one individual are shared, due to common ancestry, in another individual
- According to Hamilton's Rule, would you lay down your life for one sister?
 - Remember it will be favored if $rB - C > 0$
 - Answer is 'No': $B=1$, $C=1$ and $r=0.5$
 - $0.5(1) - 1 > 0$ (not true)
 - requires $B=3$ (three sisters) for fitness to be greater than zero.
 - or once altruism evolves in species, altruism alleles can be maintained if $B=2$ (fitness equivalent)



Hamilton's Rule problem

- Which behavior would be more highly favored?
 - Direct help to mother + father and enable them to rear 1 offspring that they would not have otherwise produced
 - Direct help to aunt + uncle and enable them to rear 5 offspring they would not have otherwise produced

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mother + father option

r between actor and
offspring = 0.5 (full sibling)

$$0.5 \times 1 \text{ offspring} = 0.5$$

Hamilton's Rule problem

- Which behavior would be more highly favored?
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mother + father option

r between actor and offspring = 0.5 (full sibling)

$$0.5 \times 1 \text{ offspring} = 0.5$$

aunt + uncle option

r between actor and offspring = 0.125 (cousins)

$$0.125 \times 5 \text{ offspring} = 0.625$$



**Increase indirect fitness
more if help aunt+uncle**

Testing the kin selection hypothesis

- Prediction 1:
 - Individuals should be more likely to help kin than non-kin
 - Pied Kingfishers help breeding pair more often when related




TABLE 13.3 Calculations of inclusive fitness for male pied kingfishers


Behavioral tactic	First year			Second year				
	y	r	f_1	o	r	s	m	f_2
Primary helper	$1.8 \times 0.32 = 0.58$			$2.5 \times 0.50 \times 0.54 \times 0.60 = 0.41$				
Secondary helper	$1.3 \times 0.00 = 0.00$			$2.5 \times 0.50 \times 0.74 \times 0.91 = 0.94$				
Delayer	$0.0 \times 0.00 = 0.00$			$2.5 \times 0.50 \times 0.70 \times 0.33 = 0.29$				

Source: Reyer [1013]

Symbols: y = extra young produced by helped parents; o = offspring produced by breeding ex-helpers and delayers; r = coefficient of relatedness between the male and y , and between the male and o ; f_1 = fitness in first year (indirect fitness for the primary helper); f_2 = direct fitness in second year; s = probability of surviving into the second year; m = probability of finding a mate in the second year.

Testing the kin selection hypothesis

- Prediction 1:
 - Individuals should be more likely to help kin than non-kin
 - Belding's ground squirrels call more often with kin nearby



Testing the kin selection hypothesis

- Prediction 2:
 - Individuals should help (quantitatively) close relatives more than distant relatives
 - White-fronted bee-eaters helping, and Lion Nursing

